In the appellate context, perhaps the two most significant rules of professional responsibility concern a lawyers obligation of candor to the court and the general prohibition against improperly disparaging a trial or appellate court. See, e.g., Douglas Richmond, Appellate Ethics: Truth, Criticism, and Consequences, 23 Rev. Litig. 301 (Spring 2004).

 

A. CANDOR TO THE COURT

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3 Candor to the tribunal

 

(a) False Evidence; Duty to Disclose. A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;

(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;

(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel;

 

* * *

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4 Misconduct

 

A lawyer shall not:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

* * *

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . ..

 

Some views on the duty of candor to the court:

 

The duty of candor supercedes the duty of zealous advocacy. See, e.g., United States v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Makt’g & Sales Mang’t of Virginia, Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 925 (4^th Cir. 1995)

 

“Any notion that the duty to represent a client trumps the obligation of professionalism is, of course, indefensible, as a matter of law.” Marvin Aspen, CJ, Let Us Be Officers of the Court, 83 A.B.A.J. at 94 (1997).

 

“All attorneys, as ‘officers of the court,’ owe duties of complete candor and primary loyalty to the court before which they practice. An attorney’s duty to a client can never outweigh his or her responsibility to see that our system of justice functions smoothly. This concept is as old as common law jurisprudence itself.” Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11^th Cir. 1993).

 

“Too many members of the Bar practice with complete ignorance of or disdain for the basic principle that a lawyer’s duty to his calling and to the administration of justice far outweighs - as must outweigh - even his obligation to his client, and, surely what we suspect really motivates many such inappropriate actions, his interest in his personal aggrandizement.” Rapid Credit Corp. v. Sunset Park Centre, Ltd., 566 So.2d 810, 812 n.1 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 1990) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring).

 

“The most general term in is “dishonesty,” which encompasses fraudulent, deceitful, or mispresentative behavior. In addition, . . . it encompasses a lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle, or a lack of fairness and straightforwardness. . . .” See People v. Katz, 58 P. 3d 1176, 1189-90 (Colo. 2002) (citation omitted).

 

As indicated in Boca Burger, Inc., not only affirmative misrepresentations, but statements misleading the judge or a court or an attorney’s knowing failure to disclose a material fact or law runs afoul of these professional duties. Id., 912 So.2d at 572 (citing Oath of Admission, West’s Florida Rules of Court-State at 1609 (2006), and R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(3)); accord Appellate Ethics, supra, at 311.

 

Counsel should be candid with the court for reasons beyond compliance with the ethical rules. A lack of candor, by misrepresenting facts or the record or failing to disclose directly adverse authority, will undermine the attorney’s credibility in this and future cases and may cause the court to doubt the client’s cause. The duty of candor, and an attorney’s desire to build credibility and assist the court, should extend to supplying careful and thorough record references for factual assertions. Federal and Florida appellate rules require this. 11^th Cir. R. 28-2(g); Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(b)(3). See Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. and John M. Scheb, Professional Responsibility of Appellate Advocates, 1 Fla. Costal L.J. 101, 114-18 (Spring/Summer 1999) (adapted from Florida Appellate Practice and Advocacy (Den Bosch, Netherlands 1998)).

 

Some examples of cases criticizing or sanctioning lawyers for false statements of material fact or law, collected in Appellate Ethics, supra at n.82, are:

 

Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (sanctioning a lawyer who, “in quoting from and citing published opinions, . . . distorted what the opinions stated by leaving out significant portions of the citations or cropping one of them, and failed to show that she and not the court has supplied the emphasis in one of them”);

 

Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Distortion of the record, by deletion of critical language in quoting from the record, reflects a lack of the candor required by . . . Rule 3.3 . . ..”);

 

Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 920 P.2d 97, 103-4 (Mont. 1996) (sanctioning an insurer whose attorney attempted to mislead a court by citing cases for opposite proposition for which they stood and omitting key language from cases);

 

Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Faber, 408 S.E. 2d 274, 280-1 (W. Va. 1991) (suspending lawyer who, among other things, misrepresented a paraphrase as a block quotation, omitting material facts contrary to lawyer’s position);

 

Sobol v. Capital Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 726 P.2d 335, 337 (Nev. 1986) (brief containing “blatant misrepresentation of . . . stipulated facts” and quoting language of case as though it were the court’s holding when, in fact, it came from the dissent).

 

B. LAWYERS’ CRITICISM OF COURTS

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8 Maintaining the integrity of the profession

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.2 Judicial and legal officials

(a) Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other Officers. A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . ..

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4 Misconduct

 

A lawyer shall not:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

 

* * *

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . ..

 

Ultimately, improper attacks on the courts or counsel discredit the lawyer in the eyes of the court and disserve the client’s cause. These expressions of anger and frustration often find their way into motions for rehearings. Lawyers should be cautious to heed the strict limitations of the applicable appellate rules. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330, 9.331. The following cases and others, collected in Appellate Advocates, supra at 120-2, show criticism of the judiciary that has been disapproved:

 

In a motion for rehearing, accusing the court of committing a judicial “sin” and “human rights” violations by issuance of a per curiam affirmance. Patton v. State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 597 So.2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 1991).

 

Accusing the court of “travesty,” “atroci” and “cop-out” by issuance of its per curiam affirmance. Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc., 716 So.2d 876, 877-8 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 1998) (quoting improper motion for rehearing in full). See also Amador v. Walker, 862 So.2d 729, 733-4 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2003) (issuing show cause order for abuse of rehearing motion and citing cases discussing the limitations on such motions under the applicable rules).

 

Statement in motion for rehearing that after the court’s “superficial and shallow review, the appellant can now only pray for simple fairness and equity.” Elliott v. Elliott, 648 So.2d 135, 135-6 (4^th DCA 1994).

 

Submitting a copy of the lower court opinion in the appellate appendix on which counsel had written “wrong” besides several of the findings. Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 381 (7^th Cir. 1989).

 

A lawyer’s motion for rehearing calling opposing counsel’s argument “ridiculous,” “a joke,” and stating that “the use of the term ‘total b<_ _ _>s<_ _ _>’ without the inclusion of at least 2 or 3 intervening expletives is very kind and generous under the circumstances.” Five-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So.2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1997).

 

Referring to tribunal as “kangaroo court,” Skolnick v. Hallett, 350 F.2d 861, 862 (7^th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 996 (1966); referring to court as “kangaroo court” and judge as a “horse’s ass,” In re Paulsrude, 311 Minn. 303, 305-6, 248 N.W. 2d 747, 748 (1976); referring to judges as “crooks.” In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 485-6 (7^th Cir. 1995).

Court criticized counsel for referring to each other at trial as “maggots,” “poor excuses for human beings,” and a “scumbag.” Landry v. State, 620 So.2d 1099, 1103 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1993).

 

Although an attorney’s allegations that a state supreme court was accepting bribes initially resulted in his disbarment, when it later was determined that some justices had accepted bribes, the lawyer was allowed to reapply. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assos. v. Grimes, 436 P. 2d 40, 46, 48 (Okla. 1967). The court still criticized counsel for suggesting all members of the court had accepted bribes absent proof. Id. at 47.

 

See also Steven Wisotsky, Professional Judgment on Appeal § 1208 (Carolina Academic Press 2002).

 

C. CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.4 Communication

(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

(b) Duty to Explain Matters to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding representation.

 

One of the most frequent complaints parties make about their attorneys concerns their failure to return phone calls and keep them apprised of the status of their cases. Keeping your client reasonably informed often will obviate the string of annoying calls that a frustrated client (or the client’s family members) may make clamoring for information. It is especially important to timely advise criminal defendants when action is taken in their cases and to apprise them of the critical deadlines for seeking further relief, i.e., motions for rehearing, petitions for review of writs of certiorari, state and federal habeas corpus petitions, etc.

 

D. ATTORNEY COMPETENCE

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.1 Competence

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for that representation.

 

At a minimum, this rule requires familiarity with and observance of the appellate rules and related ethical/professional obligations. The need for appellate rules springs from two interests: ensuring fairness in appellate proceedings (a level playing field) and enhancing/enlightening the decisional process/outcome. See Reyes-Garcia v. Rodriguez & Del Valle, Inc., 82 F.3d 11, 14 (1^st Cir. 1996).

 

While a Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief is the vehicle for challenging the constitutional effectiveness of trial counsel, a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the court of appeal is the vehicle for challenging the constitutional competence of appellate counsel. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c).

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.1 Meritorious claims and contentions

 

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.16 Declining or terminating representation

(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

(1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or Law;

 

* * *

 

(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:

(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that, the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;

(2) the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;

(3) the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;

 

* * *

 

(c) Compliance With Order Of Tribunal. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.

 

If a client requests that you file a notice of appeal, unless the trial court has given you permission to withdraw, you must comply with the request. Failure to do so is ineffective assistance of counsel regardless of the merit of the appeal. If the appeal has no merit, your remedy is to file a Memorandum (Anders) Brief and then to move to withdraw.

 

E. ATTORNEY DILIGENCE

 

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.3 Diligence

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

 

Extensions for filing briefs and other documents. Know your court. Some courts, like the Third District Court of Appeal, freely give you several extensions to file your briefs. Other courts have unwritten rules regarding the number of extensions of time they will allow. Always seek the consent of opposing counsel so, if possible, to file unopposed motions. Some courts have been known to issue orders to show cause against opposing counsel for refusing to consent to initial requests for extensions. Always extend the same courtesy you hope to receive from your opponent. Always respond to court orders regarding the filing of documents or necessary explanations.

 

Moore v. State, 519 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 1988), is an example of a lack of diligence and responsiveness to the court. Counsel failed to file a brief after an extension was granted. Counsel failed to respond to the court’s show cause order. Counsel appeared when ordered to appear and show cause and explained that he deliberately disobeyed the order to respond in writing because he knew he’d be asked to appear and could better respond in person. The court sanctioned counsel.

 

II. APPELLATE PRACTICE

 

A. PRESERVATION OF ERRORS FOR APPEAL

 

1. Overview: Failure to object is the easiest and most frequently cited basis to affirm a conviction. It forecloses most state and federal postconviction relief. Thus, object contemporaneously, with specificity, and fully (including state and federal constitutional grounds where appropriate). For an excellent list of practical suggestions, see James T. Miller, Giving Nine Lives to a Busy, Overworked Criminal Defense Attorney, Florida Defender, Vol. 17, No. 4 at 45-7 (Winter 2005).

 

2. Object Contemporaneously to error: Unless instructed otherwise by the court, don’t delay to avoid interrupting the proceedings or your opponent. At the very least, object and reserve a motion or full argument for later.

 

Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 47 (Fla. 2005) (failure to raise contemporaneous objection to improper closing argument waives review);

 

Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 332 (Fla. 1978);

 

Caldwell v. State, 5D04-3509, 2006 WL 304561 at *2 (Fla. 5^th DCA Feb. 10, 2006) (rationale underlying contemporaneous objection rule); Wooten v. State, 904 So.2d 590, 592 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2005) (same); Crumbley v. State, 876 So.2d 599, 601 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2004);

 

Woods v. State, 905 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2005) (error preserved where, though counsel inexplicably failed to hear improper testimony, counsel moved for mistrial several hours later as soon as he learned of improper comment, before jury retired);

 

Cole v. State, 866 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2004) (motion for mistrial timely where objection to improper remarks in closing sustained, but mistrial motion not made until recess preceding jury instructions).

 

3. Specify Grounds: Err on the side of specificity. Include any and all state or federal constitutional grounds. If you feel compelled, add catch-all after specific grounds.

 

Section 90.104(1)(a), Fla. Stats. (error in admission of evidence will only be recognized upon timely objection or motion to strike stating specific ground of objection unless specific ground was apparent from context).

 

Section 924.051(1)(b), Fla. Stats. (preserved error for purposes of appeal is one for which objection “was timely raised before, and ruled on by, the trial court, and that the issue, legal argument, or objection to evidence was sufficiently precise that it fairly apprised the trial court of the relief sought and grounds therefor”).

 

Harrell v. State, 894 So.2d 935 (Fla. 2005) (motion to withdraw guilty plea as coerced and involuntary fails to preserve error in trial court’s failure to formally accept plea);

 

Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 950 (Fla. 2004);

 

Harmon v. State, 527 So.2d 182, 185 (Fla. 1988);

 

Felton v. State, 919 So.2d 577, 30 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2005) (failure to raise in trial court non-fundamental error of not swearing to probation violation affidavit waives issue on appeal);

 

Mencos v. State, 909 So.2d 349, 51 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2005) (hearsay objection does not preserve confrontation clause argument);

 

Gresham v. State, 908 So.2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2005) (request for instruction on lewd and lascivious misconduct failed to preserve issue where counsel failed to specify section);

 

State v. Ayers, 901 So.2d 942, 944 (Fla. 2^nd DCA. 2005) (prosecutor’s objection “I don’t see a legal reason to depart” preserves argument on appeal that facts failed to support downward departure for isolated crime committed in unsophisticated manner);

 

Cotton v. State, 901 So.2d 241 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2005) (motion to suppress on Miranda grounds did not preserve argument that defendant’s initial detention violated fourth amendment);

 

Baskin v. State, 898 So.2d 266, 267-8 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2005) (counsel need not necessarily cite correct rule if calls attention to legal issue raised on appeal and relief sought; “magic words are not needed to make a proper objection”);

 

Cuzo v. State, 830 So.2d 177 (Fla. 4^th DCA), rev. denied, 842 So.2d 843 (Fla. 2002);

 

Jackson v. State, 738 So.2d 382, 386 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1999) (objection based on “lack of foundation” does not preserve arguments regarding all facets of the foundation that may have been missing);

 

But see Neeley v. State, 883 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2004) (hearsay objection requires court to consider all possible hearsay violations, exceptions, and exclusions);

Richardson v. State, 875 So.2d 673, 676 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2004) (general hearsay objection sufficient to preserve for appellate review the failure of the proponent to lay a proper predicate);

 

Reyes v State, 580 So.2d 309, 310 n.4 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 1991) (general objection to opinion testimony about character for truthfulness sufficient to preserve error for appeal).

 

4. Secure a Ruling: Even if you aren’t going to like it, get the court to state its ruling on the record. This avoids any claim that the judge wasn’t apprised of the objection.

 

Tolbert v. State, 5D04-2785, 2006 WL 304555 at *2-3 (Fla. 5^th DCA Feb. 10, 2006) (objection waived if litigant fails to serve a ruling; citing numerous cases); Flanningan v. State, 586 So.2d 1085, 1092 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1991) (same).

 

5. Objection by Cocounsel: In multi-defendant cases, place on record at commencement of trial that objection for one is objection for all unless defendant opts out.

Johnson v. State, 726 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1999) (objection by codefendant does not preserve ground for appeal unless defendant specifically requested to join codefendant’s objection).

 

6. Move to Strike/Request a Curative Instruction: If objection is overruled, no motion to strike or request for curative instruction is necessary. Any such motion would be futile. If objection is sustained and testimony or remark was heard by jury, motion to strike or request for curative instruction is generally necessary to preserve error for appeal.

 

Section 90.104(1)(a), Fla. Stats.;

 

Wilson v. State, 436 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1983);

 

Russ v. State, 832 So.2d 901, 909 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2002);

 

Gray v. State, 640 So.2d 186, 194-5 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1994).

 

7. Offer of Proof: Erroneous exclusion of evidence will not be considered on appeal absent offer of proof. Offer may be through testimony or proffer of counsel. Make sure proffer is thorough.

 

Miller v. State, 870 So.2d 15, 17-18 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2003) (court’s erroneous sustaining of state’s hearsay objection not preserved because defense failed to proffer testimony that was not hearsay).

 

8. Move for a Mistrial: If objection is overruled, no motion for mistrial is necessary. If objection is sustained and motion to strike or curative instruction is granted, motion for mistrial is generally necessary to preserve issue for appeal.

 

Rimmer v. State, 825 So.2d 304, 323 (Fla. 2002);

 

Wilson v. State, 436 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1983);

 

Gray v. State, 640 So.2d 186, 194-5 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1994).

 

9. Specific Errors:

 

a. Motion for judgment of acquittal: Failure to object to insufficiency of evidence or move for judgment of acquittal waives argument on appeal.

 

Romero v. State, 901 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 2005) (boilerplate motion or one simply alleging “lack of prima facie case” insufficient to preserve insufficiency of evidence as error on appeal);

 

F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 230-1 (Fla. 2003) (only exceptions to contemporaneous objection rule in this context are death penalty cases (for which Supreme Court is required to review the sufficiency of the evidence) and cases where the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the commission of a crime);

 

Sanders v. State, 905 So.2d 271 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2005) (relying on F.B. exception to reverse kidnaping conviction where there was no evidence that movement of victim in apartment was more than incidental to sexual battery);

 

Goad v. State, 887 So.2d 415, 416 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2004) (failure to make a particular argument for acquittal below waives argument on appeal).

 

b. Motion to suppress: In abundance of caution, renew objection at trial upon prosecutor’s offer of evidence sought to be suppressed. In Florida state courts, renewal is unnecessary; in federal court objection must be renewed.

 

Section 90.104 (1)(b), Fla. Stats. (2003), Rulings on Evidence: “. . . If the court has made a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before a trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”

In re: Amendments to the Florida Code - Section 90.104, 914 So.2d 940 (Fla. 2005) (adopting 2003 amendment to section 90.104(1)(b) recited above).

 

c. Motion in Limine: In an abundance of caution, renew motion at time evidence is offered at trial. But see newly amended section 90.104(1)(b), Fla. Stats. (renewal of objection or offer of proof unnecessary where trial court made definitive ruling on the record at or before trial).

 

Tolbert v. State, 5D04-2758, 2006 WL 304555 at *3 (Fla. 5^th DCA Feb. 10, 2006) (explaining reasoning underlying 2003 amendment to Fla. Stats. §90.104(1)(b).

 

d. Jury Selection: Claimed error in seating juror must be renewed before jury is sworn. See, e.g., Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1993); Arnold v. State, 755 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1999).

 

Scott v. State, 3D04-1455, 2006 WL 288153 (Fla. 3^rd DCA Feb. 8, 2006) (error in denial of peremptory challenge preserved despite failure to renew where trial court twice assured defense counsel objection was preserved and panel was accepted shortly after court inquired whether there was any other business to address).

 

e. Jury Instructions: Error concerning giving or failing to give jury instruction waived unless party objects before jury retires “stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.390(d).

 

Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 950 (Fla. 2004) (although defense counsel objected to special instruction at trial, failure to make specific argument urged on appeal waived argument);

 

Bain v. State, No. 3D02-2625, 2005 WL 475416 (Fla. 3^rd DCA March 2, 2005) (assertion that law should be changed insufficient to preserve claim on appeal that instruction was incorrect statement of law).

 

f. Double Jeopardy: Error is fundamental; failure to object does not preclude appellate review. Don’t bank on this-object, object, object.

 

State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941, 944-5 (Fla. 2005);

 

Charneco v. State, 917 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2005);

 

Romage v. State, 890 So.2d 550 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2005);

 

Scarola v. State, 889 So.2d 108 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2004).

 

g. Insufficient plea colloquy: Must be raised in trial court within 30 days of plea. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii);

 

In Re Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172, 911 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2005) (adopting requirement that defendants be advised of potential Jimmy Ryce Act consequences).

 

Williams v. State, 873 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2004);

 

B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW: The standard of review must be set forth in the Appellant’s initial brief. Fla. App. P. 9.210(b)(5). The outcome of any appeal may well turn on this standard.

 

1. Motions to Suppress: Historical facts are presumed correct and may not be rejected if supported by competent substantial evidence; legal concl